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Abstract. The paper discusses basic models of divine action and intervention. 
However, the most part of the article is dedicated to the question whether or 
not there are theistic reasons to stick to some sort of non-interventionism. 
Therefore, Schleiermacher’s argument is put under scrutiny and presented in 
a way that could substantiate some version of non-interventionism. Additionally, 
the paper explores an argument in favor of non-interventionism coming from 
a specific notion of divine aseity and self-sufficiency. Ultimately the paper votes 
for a broader notion of the God-world-relationship alluding to the idea of the 
world being God’s body.
INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, German theology has become fully aware 
of the problem of divine agency. The number of monographs and book-
chapters, articles and essays dealing with this very specific topic is still 
growing. It seems as if divine agency has become the topic that hurts most 
or, to put it into more friendly terms, reveals what we truly think about 
the concept of God and the relationship between God and the world. 
Supposedly, the so-called anthropological turn in theology or variety of 
anti-realistic approaches to theological statements (based on a  certain 
mode of giving credit to Kant) has somehow put all the questions related 
to divine attributes on the back burner for quite a while. However, in 
the meantime these questions are back – for a number of reasons. One 
of those reasons is that divine agency is the topic where the proverbial 
rubber meets the street and where the antagonism of science and religion 
comes into sight. But most of all, it is the area where our notion of God 
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becomes entirely crucial. It is apparent that you cannot have a concept of 
divine action without getting your concept of God affected. So it is not 
just accidental that Reinhold Bernhardt, who offered one of the most 
prominent and well-received accounts of divine action in the German 
speaking area and who advertises the idea of a divine ‘force-field’ of love, 
turns to a  rather a-personal or hyper-personal concept of the divine,1 
whereas Klaus von Stosch in his masterly crafted defense of (so to speak: 
weak) divine intervention ultimately embraces open theism.2
However, in this paper I am not going to talk about the benefits of 
having either a  personal or a  non-personal concept of God. Having 
a non-personal concept of God might get you out of some of the age-old 
atrocities of what John Bishop as well as Ken Perszyk have called 
‘omni-God theism’.3 On the other side, we have to face the demands of 
‘Abrahamitic Theism’, which seems to commit us to a personal concept 
of God. In addition, there are many who believe that you cannot be 
a Christian, if you do not believe in some sort of direct divine intervention.
But what is direct divine intervention? The easiest answer is that direct 
intervention happens  – as direct intervention performed by human 
being does  – at the level of basic actions. Once you want to perform 
a higher-type action of some sort, it will still be your own action, but 
it will be a mediated action in this case, even if it is constituted by your 
very own basic actions. So, if one is willing to accept divine basic actions, 
he/she should give an account of what such divine basic actions could 
consist of: Could they be purely mental activities (and how would they 
relate to a physical universe)? Or would they rather be bodily movements 
leading up to the somewhat extravagant idea that God possesses a body 
(or has our universe as his body)? A  second proposal would be that 
divine actions could be called ‘direct’, if and only if they are not mediated 
through agents who are different from God or through events that are 
not simultaneously the truth-makers of divine basic actions. Although 
mediation of that sort could as well be within the range of divine agency 
(and it could also be a way of interacting with a world which is truly 
preferred by God), anyone who insists on the possibility of direct divine 
intervention might wish to add a second mode of divine agency: God 
is capable of performing actions which are not in need of any further 
1 Cf. R. Bernhardt (1999: 399-439).
2 Cf. von Stosch (2006).
3 Cf. Bishop & Perszyk (2014: 1-17).
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mediation. This request finally brings us to the third interpretation of 
what could be called ‘direct intervention’: Within the human realm basic 
actions are realized by some kind of event-forming ‘material’ – we may 
as well speak of physiological or biological processes as the prerequisite 
of performing basic actions in a  physical universe. But it seems that 
a certain reading of divine aseity rules out the possibility of divine basic 
actions being made of some (more or less material) stuff or are realized 
by further processes, which are not truly and necessarily internal to God. 
Finally, a fourth notion of direct divine interaction could be associated 
with the idea that a divine agent responds directly to a certain situation 
at a given time. In this case, the problem does not arise from the question 
whether God needs intermediaries or not, but whether an  eternal 
being can truly respond to a state of affairs seated in time. Since God is 
considered to be beyond time (and, therefore, lacks some sort of time-
indexed knowledge), it is quite dubious, whether or not he is able to bring 
about alternative states of affairs in a temporal or even timely manner.
Unfortunately, it is not always entirely clear in contemporary 
theological literature what proponents of a  so-called ‘direct divine 
intervention’ specifically mean by the phrase in question. It seems to me 
that all the aspects of meaning mentioned above play a certain role for 
a correct understanding of this view. Nevertheless, I take the aspect of 
God not being in need of a by-relation in order to cause certain events as 
the core criterion of interventionist approaches.
I. MODELS
It was actually Ian T. Ramsey who first (to my knowledge) used the 
phrase “model” to talk about different analogies and conceptualizations 
of divine action. The beauty of his distinction is its simplicity, because 
it circles around two poles. Ramsey’s very own conceptualizations 
seem to offer a less complicated approach than, for instance, Reinhold 
Bernhardt’s distinction between an  agent-per sonal, a  sapiential-
ordinative, and a representational model of divine agency.4 Moreover, it 
does not get stuck in the somewhat unlucky and unfruitful distinction 
between a  so-called causal and a  so-called personal model of divine 
agency, since – from a certain point of view – persons have to be causally 
effective in order to have an impact as personal agents. However, I grant 
4 Cf. Bernhardt (1999: 314-439).
82 THOMAS SCHÄRTL
that the latter concept just wants to emphasize that divine agency is best 
pictured in terms of friendship and love or in terms of the aesthetic 
beauty of a certain presence, instead of billiard balls being stopped or 
developments being put on hold by a super-powerful divine influence.
According to Ramsey, the two poles we have to consider when we 
talk about divine action are economy (oikonomia) on the one hand and 
presence on the other.5 Intuitively, in those distinctions all the aspects and 
worries we may have with divine action are named and put into focus: 
Do we not want to experience divine presence in our human realm – 
a  presence, which includes some kind of unmediated encounter with 
the divine? Although the notion of presence straightforwardly seems to 
point at direct divine intervention, it is far from being clear whether this 
is really the case. Once you take a closer look at experiences within the 
human realm as points of comparison, the demands and standards of 
presence seem to differ on a case-by-case basis: It is quite different for 
us, to experience the presence of a neighbor, a friend or of a spouse. But, 
of course, there are areas of overlap, since presence does not necessarily 
require bodily presence. Rather, we want to catch the attention of the 
person, which is meant to be present with us. People can be physically 
present to us, but still seem to be light-years away from us, if their heads 
are in the clouds. Also the opposite is true: Persons can be close to us, 
although we have no chance to interact with them by immediate physical 
contact  – we talk to them on the phone, contact them via email and 
feel their presence due to the fact that we get their attention. Only the 
framework of the intimate relationship of lover and beloved seems to 
require both physical and mental presence. Nevertheless, it is quite sound 
to say that even in those cases of close intimacy presence is still mediated 
to a certain extent, because bodily presence serves as a key symbol to the 
presence of the mind.
It is interesting to note that talking about divine presence as a model 
of approaching divine activity does not require that we make a decision 
between immediate and mediated forms of divine presence beforehand. 
Ramsey, for instance, is very careful and reluctant in doing so, because he 
reminds us of divine omnipresence, which seems to rule out an additional 
presence of the divine as a surplus or addendum to omnipresence.6 Thus, 
Ramsey introduces the notion of God’s ordinary presence:
5 Cf. Ramsey (1973: 15-39).
6 Cf. Ramsey (1973: 31).
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How can God be both locatable and non-locatable; here in this place, 
and yet such that the heaven of heavens cannot contain him? What 
I  have offered [...] is the suggestion that what is sometimes called 
God’s ‘ordinary presence’, non-locatable presence, is better  – and less 
misleadingly – called God’s ubiquity or omnipresence. Such ubiquity is 
revealed in each and every cosmic disclosure: it relates to that activity, 
power, other than ourselves, which any and every cosmic disclosure 
discloses.7
The second model of an extraordinary divine presence is characterized 
by Ramsey as follows:
[T]o speak of the locatable presence of God is to speak of the activity 
of God which is displayed through, and so modelled in terms of, the 
presence of finite things and persons.8
It is noteworthy that the latter does not seem to require straightforward 
divine intervention or what some call ‘direct’ intervention. Maybe this 
is due to the fact that Ramsey’s approach remains on a rather epistemic 
level and is less interested in the modelling of models. As soon as one is 
willing to push the distinction offered by Ramsey just a little bit further, 
some blurring of the outlines of both aspects might result: Divine 
ubiquity allows the disclosure of everything as being affected by the 
divine, while extraordinary divine presence requires the identification 
of certain events, things or persons as displaying the presence of the 
divine. It seems that the latter presupposes the ontological basis which 
is referred to by the former. But we would have to add some further 
specifications to keep what Ramsey called ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ 
presence distinct from each other – by introducing, as I would phrase it, 
the idea of belonging to the cosmos as a whole. Ordinary divine presence 
would be accessible, as soon as we regard each and every event of the 
world as part of a well-structured cosmos, which is able to disclose divine 
presence. In contrast, extraordinary divine presence would presuppose 
the specific identification or (to use Ramsey’s phrases) location of divine 
presence, which – as a  location – comes always at the risk of idolatry9 
or (to allude to Freud) building up a  fetish. I don’t want to claim that 
any location of that sort is outright impossible (quite the opposite), but 
7 Ramsey (1973: 39).
8 Ramsey (1973: 34).
9 Cf. Ramsey (1973: 36-37).
84 THOMAS SCHÄRTL
I throw in the caveat that extraordinary divine presence demands some 
crystal clear criteria of identifying its manifestations in space and time. 
Whatever we come up with, we have to be careful, because the ‘mystery, 
therefore magic’-fallacy might haunt us.
Ramsey’s second model of divine activity is the analogy of economy – 
which he identifies as the most prominent idea on divine action found 
among the church fathers.10 The most important aspect of this model is 
to identify events which are able to disclose certain patterns:
Suppose now we see an  array of stones in a  continuous wavy line. 
Something might strike us, demand our attention, stir us to ask questions, 
‘What caused the stones to fall into this pattern?’, and these questions 
might be answered in terms of the tidal currents, the shelving of the 
beach, the size of the pebbles and so on. In this way the pattern of stones 
would be set in a progressively larger pattern of causal antecedents, and 
the way prepared for a cosmic disclosure [...].11
What we can learn from this example is that we need more insight and 
information to derive a personal origin, because patterns do not per se 
refer back to a person. Thus, we need to point to intentions we are aware 
of or to circumstances which make it unavoidable to trace the patterns 
back to the will of a person. Therefore Ramsey adds:
The Christian model of economy, like the Christian household is 
contextualized in love: which means that for empirical fit it must be 
possible to find patterns in the universe which can be ‘interpreted by 
love’.12
The model of economy fits nicely to what parts of the tradition had 
to say about divine providence: God has installed a  certain order of 
being and  – at least in the view of some of the church fathers  – also 
a  supernatural order of salvation. Order in this case means that every 
event is given a certain value, a certain interconnectedness with other 
events, and a certain meaning determined by God’s point of view. If God 
has some sort of serious foreknowledge, general providence and special 
providence (as it is related to certain individuals or events) turn out to 
be two sides of the same coin. The idea of economy does not preclude 
direct divine intervention, but its metaphorical surplus of meaning (as 
10 Cf. Ramsey (1973: 18-20).
11 Ramsey (1973: 16).
12 Ramsey (1973: 20-21).
85DIVINE ACTIVITY
well as its cultural shaping) could as well be combined with some forms 
of the above-mentioned ‘by-relation’: There might be certain instances 
or causes, which are capable of serving as mundane causes in order to set 
a divine plan in motion.
Although the concepts of presence and economy seem to be 
antagonistic to a  certain extent, it is by no means necessary to regard 
them as fierce adversaries. If we take a  second look at the historical 
shaping of the model of economy, we can also refer to the Greek and 
Hellenistic idea that the father of the household or the emperor installs 
a certain order (economy) in order to guarantee, thanks to the help of 
intermediaries, the execution of his will. In this view, certain instances 
of intermediaries can be regarded as making the presence of the father/
emperor accessible. Although this notion may contain some sort of legal 
fiction, it does not rule out a more serious metaphysical option which 
says: a certain entity x can be present to another entity y thanks to the 
performances of an entity z, if there is a specific context and if there is 
a strong enough relation between x and z, which makes this transitivity 
of presence possible. Of course, it might be asked whether or not the 
idea of immediate access could be put into question by introducing such 
a  model. However, the idea of mediated presence is, as it stands, not 
seriously threatening the very notion of presence, because even in the 
human realm we find countless examples of how presence is mediated 
by certain instruments without destroying the true presence of the one 
we are ultimately referring to.
II. MOTIVES
The idea of economy can be easily combined with the Christian doctrine 
of the Trinity. Considering many attempts of the Church Fathers to 
explain the mystery of the Trinity – as e.g. the writings of Origen –, it 
seems to be quite obvious that classical paradigms do not commit us to 
a concept of direct divine intervention. In fact, it rather is the other way 
round: We find the idea that God, as the father, can interact with the world 
only through the Logos and the Spirit. To Origen, there is no other way to 
keep divine transcendence intact while sticking to the idea that God has 
some serious impact on the world. Unfortunately, contemporary social 
Trinitarians are guilty of having blurred the outlines and sold out the 
benefits of the more classical model. Indeed, if the Logos is a full-blooded 
agent (as the Spirit is supposed to be according to social Trinitarian 
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models) we won’t get any helping hand from Trinitarian theology and 
we even risk to increase the various problems of direct intervention. 
However, for Origen there is no direct intervention of the Father, since 
everything is mediated through the Logos and the Holy Spirit. While the 
Logos encapsulates the idea of economy and providence, the Spirit is the 
warrant of divine presence.13 According to this classic theologian, the 
Spirit’s gift is purely epistemic, because he enables us to see patterns of 
divine presence and activity. Patterns are regarded to be signs – and this 
would be the door that opens up to describe the precise role and essence 
of the Logos: The Logos is the sign of the Father, who has the capacity of 
leaving imprints in the world pointing back to the providence and love 
of God and who can be detected thanks to the support coming from the 
Holy Spirit. According to this view, incarnation is most appropriate and 
fitting, because it would be the most privileged way for God to leave his 
signs in the created world, which – based on the Holy Spirit – are also 
instances of divine presence. If Origen were cornered and asked whether 
his picture of divine interaction is interventionist tout court, the answer 
would be rather complicated and, to a certain extent, unsatisfying for the 
interventionist, since there is, to say the least, ultima facie no unmediated 
agency of God, the Father. Furthermore, the role of the Logos is – if the 
Logos is meant to have a serious effect on the world – deeply related to 
human nature. Furthermore, the works of the Holy Spirit can hardly be 
described in terms of agency – given that the supra-personal or a-personal 
descriptions of the Spirit are true: the Spirit is more like a force of nature, 
the warmth of a sunbeam or the splendor of the divine majesty than what 
we call a personal agent in a contemporary sense.14 So, if we try to access 
the conceptual framework of these metaphors, the least we can say is that 
the activities of the Holy Spirit should not predominantly be interpreted 
in terms of independent actions of a free agent, since the Spirit is also the 
mode of divine presence in a non-divine realm.
It is equally important to underline that Ramsey’s notion of economy 
revolves around the concept of patterns. As it seems, the disclosure of 
divine agency is epistemologically bound to the identification of those 
patterns. But what if our universe has to be considered as displaying great 
ambiguities? Just think of Paul Moser’s famous ‘Hell’s Canyon Parable’15: 
13 Cf. Schärtl (2003: 148-149).
14 Cf. Schärtl (2014).
15 Cf. Moser (2010: esp. 3-15).
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Lost in the desert, we find an abandoned police station and finally get 
to detect an old radio, which might well work, but we have no reason to 
believe that anyone is at the receiving end of that radio. Since we don’t 
know whether or not the station is abandoned forever and whether or 
not the radio still works, hope beyond hope might be the most we can 
get. Coming back to divine agency we can pretty much tell the very same 
story: Our universe displays countless wonders and produces incredible 
beauty, but it also contains horrendous evils, which make it hard to 
believe in God pictured as the ultimate rational and morally good agent. 
Of course, there are the patterns of ultimate love and goodness to be 
found in this universe, but these patterns are over-written by other 
patterns, which rather point to Schopenhauer’s worldview: that there is 
an a-moral force of life being at work everywhere at the universe, which 
does not really care about the fate of an individual entity. This ambiguity 
remains even if we come up with the most sophisticated theodicy.
But one could also defend this ambiguity from God’s perspective. 
If the ultimate goal of human existence is to seek and to find God on 
one’s own terms, a certain level of ambiguity is needed. I take this to be 
one of the core motivations in Klaus von Stosch’s work on reconciling 
divine agency with a theory of revelation and the problem of theodicy: 
As it stands, divine intervention (and let us now just take revelation 
as an additional version of divine agency), must not rule out doxastic 
freedom, which I would rephrase as the ability to come to belief in God 
based on a willful and deliberate decision (and not by force of any kind).16
However, I have to admit that this picture is still quite optimistic. If we 
approach the problem of evil from a rather existential side, we may as well 
say that we continuously have to look into an abyss of horrendous evils, 
which seriously casts doubts whether or not there are instances of divine 
intervention. One can even include this statement into a refined logical 
argument from evil. As Ken Perszyk and John Bishop have brilliantly 
put it: Given that there is an  eschatological good end to the universe 
(created beings are meant to encounter) and given that the amount of 
evil is such that no greater good defense is able to conceptually cope with 
it, we might as well question the nature of God as being a rational and 
morally good agent.17 If this conclusion is valid, we will have only three 
ways to escape: At the end of the day, you could either doubt that God 
16 Cf. von Stosch (2006: 152-174).
17 Cf. Bishop & Perszyk (2011: esp. 122-123).
88 THOMAS SCHÄRTL
is rational or question divine goodness (and both strategies will come at 
high costs). Or you can question whether or not God should be described 
as an agent at all. And it is this insight which is one of the reasons why 
non-interventionist approaches are still around and kicking, although 
they might seem to be on life support in the meantime.
So far, I have offered two rather theological motives to be reluctant 
when it comes to talk about divine actions. If we take a look at Origen’s 
version of the Trinity again, we would have reasons to say that the 
average notion of ‘agency’ does not help at all, because it is quite unable 
to capture the nature of the divine modus operandi. Regardless, whether 
you embrace Origen’s concept of the Trinity or not, the overall question 
remains, in how far the divine nature precludes certain modes of operation 
and favors others. And if we refer back to the problem of evidence and 
ambiguity, we are, at least, left with the problem of criteria for identifying 
intervention. The Humean debate on miracles, as fallacious it might 
seem from a nowadays perspective18 (although some hold that you will 
find some kernel of truth in Hume’s way of approaching the religious 
problems of miracles19), admittedly had the advantage of providing us 
with a  criterion of divine intervention: breaking the laws of nature or 
breaking out of what is perceived to be a regularity in nature. Instead, one 
could focus on some version of ‘single causality’ – as David Armstrong 
once put it20 – and, at the same time, abandon the idea of breaking a law 
of nature, since single causality entitles us to have a purely nominalist 
account of laws of nature. In order to develop a concept of miracles, one 
would have to refer to specific powers of God, by which he is able to stop 
finite events in their execution of natural-causal dispositions and to alter 
the ordinary course of events. Indeed, I think this model is a probable 
narrative to describe the place of miracles in a post-Humean and a post-
post-Humean world. Nevertheless, the evidentalist’s question would kick 
in in terms of identifying these powers we take to be exceptional divine 
capacities. But even if we were to find such exceptional powers, you could 
not really rule out that those exceptional powers are part of the ‘natural’ 
world accessible only under certain circumstances, once you have given 
up the Humean idea of regularity and law. Why is it that exceptional 
powers displayed in exceptional situations unambiguously refer back to 
18 Cf. Johnson (1999).
19 Cf. Fogelin (2003).
20 Cf. Armstrong (1990: 204-210).
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the Christian God? Again, we must not treat mystery for divine magic. 
Without referring to the nature of divine revelation (and the nature of 
what is revealed by divine revelation) we won’t get a satisfying answer. 
Let us, for the sake of the argument, say that exceptional powers and 
situations are meant to serve as instances of revealing the divine nature 
as supremely good and benevolent. This won’t get us very far, because the 
problem of theodicy, which is a necessary side-aspect of divine agency, 
will ultimately haunt us. How can we reconcile the apparently rare 
incidents, which (still not unambiguously) seem to glimpse at the nature 
of God with the horrendously dark side of the universe? It might be – at 
least from an existential perspective – a more plausible story to claim that 
divine agency is seriously bound by the autonomy of the universe. This 
does not categorically rule out divine presence, but makes it somehow 
dependent on what events in the universe and their constituents are 
‘willing’ to display, i.e. if they are willing to serve as the intermediaries of 
divine agency or presence.
III. GOD AS THE ABSOLUTE CAUSE
Is there an  argument available, which would help us to vote against 
direct divine intervention (without voting against any form of divine 
efficacy or agency tout court) – an argument that does not fall prey to 
the naturalistic prejudice which holds that the web of natural causes 
is closed or that there is a natural flux of events and causes that must 
not be violated? It seems that some parts of contemporary systematic 
theology are eager to sign off on naturalism much too early, so that their 
reluctance in accepting incidents of special divine action is crucially 
bound to a certain version of naturalism (which could be or has already 
been proven to be rather wrong).
But I think that there is an argument available and I am inclined to 
call it the Rahner-Schleiermacher view on divine action. Before I offer 
a certain interpretation of this view, it is necessary to point out that it 
has to be purified in order to get rid of its affiliations with some sorts of 
naturalism or naturalistic determinism. I think that this affiliation is not 
required to keep the values of the argument, but that this purification 
will rather give us a reason to stick to the core of the argument.
In his Grundkurs des Glaubens, Karl Rahner raises the question 
whether there can be some kind of immediacy in relation to God. 
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If there is no such thing as an immediate/unmediated relation to God, 
then whatever we say about divine action has to be conceived in a way 
that does not simply cross out the position of finite beings vis-a-vis 
God. Therefore, Rahner emphasizes that God must not replace the role 
of finite beings and finite causes in contexts of causal efficacy.21 Instead, 
God is the transcendental ground and horizon of every being, of every 
act of being and knowing. So, the connection between God and finite 
beings is a  relation which is (exclusively?) an  encounter between the 
transcendental horizon of being on the one side and the concrete, finite 
entity on the other side. The picture of special divine agency you might get 
from Karl Rahner looks more or less like this: Any form of special divine 
action is nothing else but the becoming concrete of the transcendental 
relation between God as the absolute ground and the finite entities. 
The possibility of becoming concrete is already a feature built into the 
layout of the world. And we find this feature, for instance, whenever 
we encounter the openness of the material world towards the mental. 
We see it at work when consciousness arises in the physical universe or 
when self-conscious persons open themselves up towards experiencing 
God, who is the ultimate horizon of experience.22 In other words: Karl 
Rahner holds that God as the ‘transcendental source’ (ground/cause) of 
all being cannot intervene directly into the course of the world because 
of his nature as being the transcendental source of everything. Thus, so-
called intervention would be possible only in a mediated way: through 
events or especially through persons that have the capacity of making or 
becoming aware of the transcendental relation to God.
A comparable approach can be found in Schleiermacher23: He seems 
to have two main concerns. The first concern refers to the idea that 
21 Cf. Rahner (1976: 91): “Die Unmittelbarkeit zu Gott kann, wenn sie überhaupt 
nicht von vornherein ein absoluter Widerspruch sein soll, nicht davon abhängen, daß das 
Nicht-Göttliche schlechterdings verschwindet, wenn Gott nahekommt. Gott braucht als 
er selber nicht dadurch einen Platz zu finden, daß ein anderes, das er nicht ist, den Platz 
räumt. Denn mindestens einmal das Anwesen Gottes als des transzendentalen Grundes 
und Horizontes alles Seienden und Erkennenden (das doch auch einen Ankunft Gottes, 
einen Unmittelbarkeit zu ihm ist) geschieht ja gerade durch und in der Gegebenheit des 
endlichen Seienden.”
22 Cf. Rahner (1976: 96).
23 Cf. Schleiermacher (1830/31, part I: 240-241): “Indem nämlich dasjenige nicht erfolgt, 
was durch die Gesamtheit der endlichen Ursachen dem natürlichen Zusammenhange 
gemäß erfolgt sein würde; so wird eine Wirkung verhindert, und zwar nicht durch den 
Einfluß anderer auf natürliche Weise gegenwirkender und auch im Naturzusammenhang 
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God might serve as some sort of overriding cause. The second worry, 
however, is related to the causal closure of natural events, which seems 
to exclude any supernatural intervention. While the second concern 
is highly problematic  – because it seems to give in to some sort of 
unfounded metaphysical naturalism too easily  – the first worry is 
much more interesting and much more relevant to us. We can phrase 
Schleiermacher’s first concern like this: It is a problem, if God brings about 
event e that should otherwise have been brought about by a mundane 
cause c, because in this case God takes the job of a mundane cause. The 
problem continues if you imagine that God stops the occurrence of event 
e*, which otherwise would have been be brought about by mundane 
cause c (if c would have worked properly). In the latter case, God blocks 
the effect of cause c. So, if God intervenes into the course of the world, 
God either replaces, blocks or overrides the efficiency of c. Apparently, 
Schleiermacher thinks that ‘blocking is mocking’ while ‘enhancing the 
powers of mundane causes equals cheating’. Therefore, Schleiermacher 
has serious troubles with the notion of special divine action. But why is 
this even a problem, since blocking or overriding is pretty much what 
any agent performing a deliberate action has to do in any case?
Maybe the idea of a  causal nexus between purely natural causes is 
still at work here, because Schleiermacher thinks that natural causes 
contribute to the fact that nature will run its course, if left untouched. 
Within this order, natural and finite agents have a well-determined role 
and possess well-limited powers. Thus, Schleiermacher considers special 
divine intervention to be an annihilation of the course of events, which 
happened beforehand. However, this only makes sense if we presuppose 
that the causal or nomic web of finite properties and powers is necessarily 
closed. But, of course, we do not have to accept this presupposition.
gegebener, endlicher Ursachen, sondern ohnerachtet alle wirksamen Ursachen zur 
Hervorbringung dieser Wirkung zusammenstimmen. Alles also, was von jeher hiezu 
beitrug, wird gewissermaßen vernichtet, und statt nur ein einzelnes Übernatürliches 
mitten in den Naturzusammenhang hineinzustellen, wie man es eigentlich will, muß man 
den Begriff der Natur ganz aufheben. Die positive Seite ist nun die, daß etwas erfolgen 
soll, was aus der Gesamtheit der endlichen Ursachen nicht zu begreifen ist. Aber indem 
dieses nun als ein wirksames Glied mit in den Naturzusammenhang eintritt, so wird 
nun in alles Zukunft alles ein anderes, als wenn dieses einzelne Wunder nicht geschehen 
wäre; und jedes Wunder hebe nicht nur den ganzen Zusammenhang der ursprünglichen 
Anordnung für alle Zukunft auf, sondern jedes spätere Wunder auch alle früheren, sofern 
sie schon in die Reihe der wirksamen Ursachen eingetreten sind.”
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Now, are we entitled to give Schleiermacher some credit? I am inclined, 
as indicated above, to reread Schleiermacher’s worries differently  – in 
a  way that steers away from the highly problematic notion of causal 
closure. Instead, we should connect Schleiermacher’s intuition to the 
notion of divine providence, which is the ultimate source of a  natural 
order of causes and events as well as of features and powers built into the 
natural order:
(1) Imagine that based on divine intervention the actual world w@ 
turns out to be identical to w**, while, without divine intervention, 
it would have been identical to w*.
(2) On its own, world w@ would be identical to w*. In realizing w** 
by interfering with the course of events in w@, God expresses 
dismay and disapproval towards w*.
(3) The expression of dismay is rather a  ‘moral annihilation’ of the 
dignity of the world w* that would have been identical to w@.
(4) Having foreknowledge, God could have known right from the 
start that w@ would turn into w* and that this provokes his 
expression of disapproval. Therefore, he could have equipped the 
entities building up the substance of the actual world with features 
which secure that w@ will always turn into w**.
Schleiermacher has a  point, if we rephrase his intuitions in terms of 
divine fore-knowledge and the pre-creational approval of the world God 
is going to actualize. Then Schleiermacher’s concerns are, as it stands, 
at the very heart of the classic notion of divine providence: If God does 
have some sort of serious fore-knowledge and if he is pre-creationally 
aware of the intended course of the world which he approves, special 
divine intervention does not seem to be necessary.24
But there is something else that can be found in Schleiermacher’s 
view, which connects Schleiermacher back to the position I have outlined 
and associated with Karl Rahner: The status of God as an absolute cause 
seems to prevent God from acting in an  intermediate and direct way, 
i.e. in a  way that makes God’s agency comparable to human agency. 
24 It is important to note that once you have a  strong notion of providence you 
don’t actually need the occurrence of miracles. Cf. Hebblethwaite (1978: 224): “Divine 
providence is distinguished from miracle by the fact that in providence God is supposed 
to act in and through natural agencies to bring about his purposes and specifically not in 
the gaps between them.”
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Furthermore, the notion of a causal order, which has been established 
by God based on divine providence, seems to confront God with the 
problem of causal overdetermination in case God would want to replace, 
override or block natural causes, which are in place. Let us take a closer 
look at the issue of absolute causes. If we isolate the more important 
aspects of this idea in Rahner’s and Schleiermacher’s writings, we can 
identify three main theorems, which serve as a backbone to this view:
(1) If x is the absolute cause of y, it cannot serve as a relative/finite 
cause of y simultaneously. [from 1) seems to follow: If God is 
always the absolute cause of y he can never be the relative/finite 
cause of anything.]
(2) If x is the absolute cause of y and if y is the relative/finite cause of 
z, then x must be the absolute cause of z either.
(3) If x is the absolute cause of y and if y is brought under the 
‘influence’ of z (in case z is an ideal, a universal etc.), then x must 
be the absolute cause of z.
According to this view, to be an  absolute cause means to serve as 
an ultimate cause of being. Nevertheless, one might simply ask whether 
this notion of absolute causation, which offers the above-mentioned 
distinction between absolute and finite causes, rests on a simple dogma. 
It seems, as if the grammar of this distinction is tied to the assumption 
that there is a crucial metaphysical difference between absolute and finite 
causes. Apparently, this is also echoed in the notion of finite causes, 
although it is quite hard to define what Rahner as well as Schleiermacher 
exactly mean by finite causes in particular. If we say that finite causes 
are such that they are part of the natural order of causation, we might as 
well get stuck into a vicious cycle. Instead, I would like to introduce the 
following explications:
(a) A finite cause is finite iff it can be represented by a set of states of 
affairs whose number isn’t infinite.
(b) A  finite cause is finite iff it explanatorily depends on another 
entity.
It is easy to see that – based on those terms – God cannot play the role of 
finite causes because of his very own infinity as well as his aseity. But we 
still have to add another ingredient:
(c) Any event e that originates within the world needs a causa efficiens 
that serves as its relative/finite cause.
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The idea, which is expressed in c), states more or less that within the 
order of the world the composites of the world display a certain signature 
(as being finite). In such a situation an absolute cause would be a serious 
disturbance of the whole layout of the created world. And this might as well 
be the reason why Schleiermacher talks about the risk of ‘annihilation’: 
How can it be the case that some sort of causation, which doesn’t fit the 
parameters of the created world, enters the created world without over-
writing the above-mentioned signature and without mocking the dignity 
of finite entities? That infinity – in God’s case – might be a problem for 
divine interaction can also be accessed by some kind of weak analogy: 
Just imagine that the world fulfills the above mentioned requirements for 
non-finite causes. An eternal world would be something like an infinite 
collection of events. Does it make sense to think that the world as a whole 
works as a finite cause to bring about certain effects? Presumably not.
Now let us turn to the problem of causal over-determination. 
Overdetermination can be described as a  subspecies of redundant 
causation:
Redundant causation occurs whenever there are multiple actual distinct 
events c1, c2,  ... , cn, e, such that each cj without the other cs would 
cause e. For simplicity I  focus on the case with just two redundant 
factors, c1 and c2. In such a case, preemption (asymmetric redundancy) 
occurs whenever just one of the cs actually causes e; overdetermination 
(symmetric redundancy) occurs whenever both of the cs are causally on 
par with respect to e.
So when two vandals throw rocks that simultaneously shatter the window, 
there are three actual distinct events: c1, the throwing of one rock; c2, the 
throwing of the other rock; and e, the shattering of the window. Here c1 
and c2 are redundant causes of e. And since both c1 and c2 are causally 
on par with respect to e (neither rock arrives first, or knocks the other off 
course, etc.), c1 and c2 are overdetermining causes of e.25
Within the framework of divine agency, the problem of over-determination 
is based on a  crucial premise: The risk of over-determination arises 
only if we consider a  certain event e that would have been caused by 
a mundane cause anyway. So, imagine that God allows the world to run 
its course (free agency included while giving God some sort of middle 
knowledge in order for him to know what is going to happen). If God 
wants to bring about the event e knowing fully well that event e will 
25 J. Schaffer (2003: 23).
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occur “anyway” (thanks to the course of events and the agency of free 
agents God knows about  ... ) and if he affirms or approves it, it would 
mean overdetermination to put in an additional divine volition (if this is 
a divine basic action) or to perform a divine basic action to bring e about 
or to display supernatural powers to bring e about. As you can see, the 
over-determination warning within the area of divine agency rests on 
a very strong presupposition which says:
(A)  Every event e God wants to be brought about is capable of being 
brought about and (actually) will be brought about by mundane/
finite causes anyway.
But, of course, we can still question whether A) is acceptable. What could 
be the reasons that support A)? One reason would be to insist on the 
autonomy of the created world. However, this is just not enough – not 
just because the notion of autonomy is ambiguous, but rather because 
one might wonder whether autonomy is indeed valuable from God’s 
point of view. Instead, a strong notion of providence might help us here. 
Therefore, we need a modification of A) that looks presumably like this:
(B)  Every event e God wants to be brought about is capable of being 
brought about and (actually) will be brought about by mundane/
finite causes anyway, iff the occurrence of e is part of an order of 
events established by divine providence (right from the start).
This idea, however, would not be applicable in cases in which e is not 
part of a  foreseen course of events or of a certain order of events. But 
given divine providence, we will have to ask whether or not some event 
e can literally be outside God’s providence.26 Let us assume, just for the 
time being, that certain outcomes of libertarian free will (on the side of 
creation) are not within the range of divine providence (although from 
a Molinist point of view God would not be surprised by the occurrence 
of these events). It might as well be assumed that even direct divine 
26 I will take it that open theists will strongly disagree with this idea. The broader 
question is whether or not providence is a required divine attribute. Of course, the notion 
of providence is another burden added to the problem of theodicy. However, as Perszyk 
and Bishop have shown, the open theist is not better off with regard to this very specific 
problem. If God has some serious foreknowledge, it is hard to reconcile his knowledge of 
the horrendous evils with his morally benevolent and loving character. But if God doesn’t 
have any serious foreknowledge and just takes the risk of horrendous evils to come, this 
will not only undermine his moral character but also his position as a rational agent since 
it is downright irrational to bring about something unforeseeable ‘at all costs’. See Bishop 
& Perszyk (2011: 116-119).
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intervention cannot undo these outcomes of creaturely libertarian free 
will. Since these outcomes rest on indeterminacies, which God seems 
to have willingly put into the order of the created world, God can only 
overrule them at the cost of mocking, even annihilating creaturely 
freedom.
IV. DIVINE ASEITY
One very powerful divine attribute, which seems to demand a serious 
reconsidertation of how God acts and how he is related to the world, is 
divine aseity. We should understand divine aseity as the most radical form 
of independence. God does not depend on anything metaphysically and 
if he seems to depend on something, this is just a prima facie impression, 
which ultima facie cannot be true. So, any limitation God seems to have 
is brought upon God only and exclusively by himself. From this very 
notion of divine aseity we may derive the nature of the relation, which 
created beings have with respect to God. Whatever the different flavors 
of such a relation might be, it seems to be apparent that this relation must 
not cross out divine aseity, i.e. divine independence. It is also apparent 
that there is one prominent act of God, one instance of divine agency, 
which meets the standards of divine aseity at full length: creation. In 
creation, spelled out as creatio ex nihilo, there are no metaphysically 
robust relations established previously to the act of creation. Furthermore, 
creation is best approached as an instance of David Armstrong’s singular 
causality, because the event of creation is singular by itself. Before and 
at the moment of creation, there is no chance of referring to laws and 
regularities, because apart from God there are no further entities having 
any properties or displaying any dispositions, which could serve as 
truthmaker of regularities we are willing to detect.
The creation-mode of activity keeps divine aseity fully intact and, 
equally, asserts the full dependency of the created world. So, we can state 
as the basic signature of any finite entity:
(SFE)  ∀x (If x is not identical to God, or if x is not a proper part, 
attribute or aspect of God or of the divine essence → God 
contributes in the creation-mode to the existence of x as long 
as x exists).
My proposal at this point is that divine agency is predominantly and 
exclusively performed in creation-mode, if divine aseity has to be taken 
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seriously. I will also add the somewhat courageous (if not outrageous) 
idea that any additional form of divine agency would put God himself in 
the weird position of being guilty of causal overdetermination by himself.
To understand this, we need a somewhat more complex understanding 
of creation. In order to get there, I  will make use of Brian Leftow’s 
distinction between initial creation and late creation. Leftow starts out 
with a very basic notion of creation – pointing out that God provides 
the material mundane beings are made of. Let us just, for the time being, 
assume that the material substitutes of finite beings are what van Inwagen 
or Merricks call ‘material simples’. Then we arrive at the following picture 
of creation:
Simples make up David’s block of marble. If all of these were created, all 
David’s parts were created. If all parts or all stuff of David are created, 
God made all of David appear ex nihilo. By doing so he made a creating-
ex-nihilo causal contribution to David: He made the creating-ex-nihilo 
sort of difference for David by providing all David’s matter ex nihilo. This 
is God’s necessary but insufficient contribution to David’s appearance. 
Taken in terms of this, ‘God created David’ is a loose way to say that God 
created all of David, and the latter is a consequence of his making all of 
the universe begin to exist. [...] [I]n a slightly thicker sense of ‘creates’, 
God creates David with C’s help, as C determines that it is David God 
creates, though God made His whole creative contribution to David by 
strict-sense creating all of the universe.27
However, this basic notion of creation is not satisfying. If we say that God 
is the creator of everything, his role has to be more robust and somewhat 
more important. So, Leftow continues:
We can add to this first model to ‘thicken’ the sense in which God creates 
items that appear after the universe begins. Suppose, for example, that at 
the beginning or later, God creates ex nihilo some deterministic causal 
systems, primed to act. He foreknows all that they will bring about. 
Surely He fully intends some of it. (Perhaps He merely accepts some, as 
a foreknown but unintended price for effects He wishes: perhaps these 
effects are unavoidable given these creatures’ natures.) By putting these 
systems in place primed to act as He intends, God causes them to bring 
about what He intends. So God works through such systems once they 
exist, even if He is not currently willing their results. So if God creates 
27 Leftow (2012: 15).
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such a system, He in a thicker sense creates things which appear by its 
deterministic workings: through it He arranges parts into wholes whose 
existence He intends. If God has created some deterministic systems ex 
nihilo and intends the existence of at least some things He knows that 
they will bring to exist, God late-creates some items this way.28
But even this picture is not satisfying in every respect. The very last 
step would be to throw in some devices that safeguard the freedom of 
creatures, which are endowed with some kind of significant free will:
If God led Michaelangelo to carve as he did, God in this thick sense 
made David through him. The system consisting of God, Michaelangelo, 
and the rest of C is not deterministic, but it is close enough to being so to 
let us say that God creates through Michaelangelo.
These additions yield a second model: God as remote and creatures as 
proximate causes of late creation. On this model, both God and creatures 
act in ways that guarantee an effect; that is, are individually sufficient for 
it. God ‘late-creates’ only through creatures.29
However, we have to add that the distinction between initial creation and 
late creation makes sense from a finite perspective only. If God is eternal, 
initial creation and late-creation happen at the very same instance for 
him, within the one eternal now. Thus, we might as well assume that 
initial creation and late-creation are just two aspects of one and the same 
action, since no sequence of time is available to God to discriminate 
and distinguish different instances of activity. So, if late-creation is just 
a metaphor to describe from a human and temporal perspective what 
seems to be some sort of a later appearance (but within God’s context this 
would not be correct, since creation and late-creation are simultaneous 
and happen in one eternal “now”), we may introduce a transitive notion 
of creation. But what can we gain from a transitive notion of creation for 
the case of divine agency?
Imagine a slightly enriched picture of initial creation and late creation, 
adding some further ingredients to Leftow’s approach. This way we can 
put some flesh to the bones of a transitive notion of creation. For instance,
(1) if God creates the raw material of the universe,
(2) if God determines universals or laws or causally relevant 
properties and powers,
28 Leftow (2012: 16).
29 Leftow (2012: 16-17).
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(3) if God creates finite agents,
(4) if God determines the essences of agents and grounds the 
counterfactuals of their freedom within those essences,
(5) and if one agent brings about event e,
(6) then God is related to this event e in the creation mode.
The problem of over-determination is couched in the question whether 
immediate divine action – imagine for the moment that it could, indeed, 
occur – could do anything further which would not already be provided 
by the creation-mode of divine action. Again, let us use our imagination: 
Imagine that God determined by creation mode that a certain event e 
will occur and additionally decides in a later-stage ‘non-creation’-mode 
(displaying a specific instance of his will) that e will occur, then this would 
be a (strange) version of causal over-determination. For in this case, God 
would display two distinct volitions (one might add that this contradicts 
the doctrine of divine simplicity) aiming at the very same effect. So, what 
could God really add to the creation mode of bringing e about? Maybe 
the second volition is meant to truly secure the occurrence of e due to the 
fact that the creation mode might not be stable enough to do so (given 
the fact that the creation mode has to secure certain probabilities in 
order to have a place for created freedom).
Even if we neglect for the time being that the notion of an instable 
creation mode remains quite puzzling, we still have to face another serious 
problem: If e is an event that can be brought about by a free finite agent 
only, then God cannot bring it about – neither in the creation mode nor 
by (ex hypothesi) direct intervention – without literally destroying the 
nature of finite beings’ free will. So, if everything that God is able to bring 
about, when he establishes the order of the world, can be brought about 
in creation mode, why would direct intervention still be necessary?
The only way how God could do anything beyond what is already 
done in creation mode would be to undo what he has installed in creation 
mode. Although it might be in accordance with the ‘raw power’ of divine 
omnipotence to replace finite causes, this very same ability might not 
be within the range of a divine omnipotence, which has confined itself 
further by a serious form of divine self-determination and limitation. In 
other words: Once God has established a certain order of being by creation 
mode it is hard to see why further intervention is really needed. If God 
has some sort of serious foreknowledge and is capable of providence, he 
is in a position to predetermine the particular course of events – at least 
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within a range of possible courses of events –, which finds his approval. 
If God has some form of middle knowledge, the possible outcomes of 
creaturely free will could be also part of his picture of the actual world. 
Again, the question arises why one needs additional divine intervention, 
which puts God himself into a position of causal overdetermination in 
presenting two colliding volitions aiming at the very same effect.
If we add, in applying Ramsey’s insights to our current debates, that 
divine presence can be mediated by mundane causes, it is hard to see 
why the eternal God, who has installed a certain order of the world by 
creation-mode, cannot be present to a certain person seated in time. But, 
of course, one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens: My 
picture crucially depends on divine eternity and foreknowledge. If you 
want to have direct divine intervention, you might as well get rid of these 
attributes – and this is the move Open Theists would have to make.
Clearly the creation mode cannot and must not imply proximity with 
regard to immediate authorship or agency, because this would overrule 
the fact that finite beings can serve as the prima facie causal sources of 
certain mundane events. Nevertheless, God is related to every event e by 
creation mode. Based on middle knowledge God could have furnished 
the essences of agents in a way that order the counterfactuals of freedom 
for each event and every agent to an eschatologically good end. Based on 
a strong notion of providence we have to say that God has established 
the laws of nature (or the powers of finite beings) as well as the material 
the world consists of in a way that secures a course of the world which 
finds divine approval. Why would God still need specific and direct 
intervention  – especially if we take into account that the outcome of 
finite free will must not be under the full control of God?
Well, this picture will still cast certain doubts, because it looks as if 
God is only indirectly involved in altering the course of events, when 
he has to create the material of the world, powers and properties, finite 
agents themselves and when he has to determine laws and essences etc. 
in order to ‘late’-create a  certain event. It seems that the material, the 
laws and the essences are very complex and intermediary means to the 
end and that they are either constituting divine agency or realizing some 
kind of creatio-continua-kind of activity. However, from a divine point of 
view, creation and late-creation are just two sides of one coin – ultimately 
based on a  single divine volition, which unfolds into the continuing 
creation of the universe. Divine simplicity and eternity would give us, 
I assume, further reasons to embrace the creation-mode of divine action.
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V. CONCLUSION
Of course, causa efficiens is not the best way to think about the impact 
God may have on the world. In my proposal, the causa efficiens mode 
of operating is reserved to the creation mode of agency in God’s case, 
because this mode is the only way to preserve divine aseity.
I am quite intrigued by the idea (contemporarily presented by John 
Bishop and Ken Perszyk) that God predominantly (if not exclusively) 
serves as a formal and final cause to the universe. This could be a way to 
strengthen the model of divine economy as well as the notion of divine 
presence, which does not compete with a  view that demands finite 
causes for finite effects. To make my point clear, I am inclined to refer 
to a common analogy: God as the formal cause of the universe could be 
seen as the soul of a body, which is the universe itself. This would give us 
a chance to identify mundane events as basic divine actions, if those events 
somehow respond to an attraction which is given to them by the formal 
cause. Furthermore we could also see the emergence of new features 
in the world as the result of the above-mentioned tendency towards 
supreme goodness and beauty, if those features are presuppositions of 
the occurrence of entities which realize ultimate goodness or ultimate 
beauty.30 If God’s nature is nothing less but supreme goodness, the 
attraction of goodness could be the pattern we need in order to identify 
divine activity in the world.
If we make use of this model, there might be additional benefits. We 
could, for instance, introduce the idea of a  continuous incarnation of 
the divine. This very idea is not completely extravagant because you 
can find it in the writings of classic Christian theologians like Maximos 
Confessor.31 Christopher Knight maintains that this view would allow 
us a  ‘pansacramental’ approach32, because it offers the prerequisites to 
30 Cf. Hebblethwaite (1978: 227): “There is also the argument that evolutionary theory 
cannot actually explain the appearance of new and higher levels of organization out of 
the interaction of lower levels. It is not a question of gaps. The descriptive evolutionary 
story is continuous. Higher levels have emerged out of the lower. We are not to suppose 
that additional items have surreptitiously been fed in. But the whole process leading from 
‘elementary patterns of energy to the limitless complexity of the physical instrument 
of Shakespeare’s wit or Newton’s genius’ is not self-explanatory. We do not detect the 
Creator’s hand at this point and at that. But the whole story manifests his providential 
work in and through the gradual complexification of organic life; for it manifests 
a teleology hard to deny.”
31 Cf. Knight (2005: 182-183).
32 Cf. Knight (2005: 193).
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understand incarnation as the process in which the universe gets closer 
to the nature of God and is in a progressively better position to display 
the very features of the divine nature, namely ultimate goodness and 
beauty. Of course, in order to get to this point we are relying on a very 
peculiar understanding of incarnation, which  – alluding to Hegel  – 
means the presence and realization of the infinite or ultimate within the 
finite universe. If you take this approach, indeed everything can become 
the medium which reveals and realizes divine presence. However, as 
a crucial criterion we would have to add that this only happens when the 
mundane entity is willing to be attracted and, therefore, shaped by the 
ultimate form which is the divine nature.
Let me add an  additional note: Some theologians have introduced 
a very specific interpretation of quantum indeterminacy in order to offer 
a causal joint for divine action. But this is presumably misconceived as it 
runs into further problems33: If something is regarded as indeterminate, 
it still implies breaking a  law of nature (or some kind of rule which is 
equivalent to a  law of nature) if God starts messing around with the 
statistical probabilities in order to guarantee a  certain outcome even 
if this messing around goes undetected for the human observer. Still, 
the whole story would be a  case of some sort of heavy-weight divine 
interference, which seriously jeopardizes the dignity of the created 
order. Instead, we may very well interpret indeterminacies in nature as 
the dispositions God could have built into nature (by creation-mode) 
in order to let nature respond to the attraction of the formal cause. The 
patterns we would have to identify in order to talk about divine agency 
and activity are analogous to the patterns we detect once we find out that 
there is a  serious difference between being a corpse and being a body 
owned by a person. If contemporary naturalism gives us the impression 
that humans are just parasites inhabiting a  corpse, theism must come 
up with signs that the universe and its development resemble a  lively 
organism.
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